Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1957

Book Review. Sutherland, A. E., The Law and One Man Among
Many
Kenneth B. Hughes
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Law and Society Commons, Legal Theory Commons, and the Natural Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hughes, Kenneth B., "Book Review. Sutherland, A. E., The Law and One Man Among Many" (1957). Articles
by Maurer Faculty. 2001.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2001

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles
by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

1957 ]

BOOK REVIEWS

worthWhile book, but it will not be the last material which a lawyer
will buy to assist him in the drafting of leases.
RO3ERT N. CooK*

THE LAW AND ONE MAN AMONG MANY. By Arthur E. Sutherland.
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956. Pp. ix, 101. $2.50.
The central problem with which The Law and One Man Among
Many is concerned is the relation of individual man to collective man
in our highly organized twentieth century society. This calls for a
re-examination of the fundamentals of human freedom under law in
our own time. Particular attention is devoted to the complex interplay
of competing and conflicting freedoms and restraints which are fixed
by a wide variety of controlling pressures upon the individual. Professor Sutherland concludes that man's freedom is the mathematical
sum of all the multiple helps and hindrances supplied or imposed by
his natural, his private, and his civic surroundings. The extent to
which our courts take cognizance of these respective helps atd hindrances in the settlement of controversies between individuals, or
between individual man and the group, and the perception of justice
in the treatment thus afforded, is the subject of detailed inquiry.
This slender volume of one hundred pages derives from Professor
Sutherland's preparation and delivery of the Rundell Lectures at the
University of Wisconsin Law School. As the author so readily concedes, on this subject there has been no end of the making of many
books by many philosophers. But any lack of novelty which may attach
to the subject matter is outgained by the insights he brings to bear
upon the problem, which is of such persistent interest to all students
of the administration of justice. The author combines clarity of style
with an interesting array of legal and non-legal source materials,
and avoids the ponderousness and pomposity which mark so many
inquiries in this complex and difficult field.
In format, the book falls into the three-part pattern which a series
of three separate but related lectures would naturally impose. Despite
this forced episodic quality, the author achieves continuity and a high
degree of integration through the medium of periodic restatements of
position and purpose, and the use of a brief epilogue.
Under the sub-title "Fashions in Individualism," the first part of
the book is given over to consideration of the meaning of freedom as
applied to the individual in his relation to the many. The several
political, economic and cultural connotations of "individualism" are
-developed by liberal quotation from a sampling of savants and special
*Ptofessor of Law, Western Reserve University.
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pleaders, past and present. Periodically changing styles which affect
the use of words like individualism and collectivism in describing
opposite social philosophies are graphically illustrated. The alternate
triumph or rejection of these terms in the legal order, when freedom
of the individual is at stake, calls for something more precise in the
way of helpful definition. Accordingly, Professor Sutherland chooses
to define "individualism" as a belief in the desirability of man's being
left to do as he pleases, so long as he does not too shockingly interfere
with somebody else's doing the same. This definition subsumes that
the most desirable objective for a society to achieve is the greatest
possible average individual freedom for the members of that society.
It follows, then, that the great problem of our society is to decide what
limits collective man will put on the individual's acting to please himself.
Under the sub-title "Freedom Added and Subtracted" the second
part of the book is devoted to examination of a variety of decided cases
wherein our courts have appeared to add and subtract the elements
of freedom to which individuals have laid competing claim, either
against the crowd, or against other individuals with inconsistent freedoms of their own to maintain. The difficulty of the judge, who must
find merit in the conflicting desires of individuals or of groups, is
readily apparent in cases involving competing evangelical factions,
racial groups, occupiers of land, and government security risks.
Under the sub-title "Perception of Justice," the final section of the
book deals with man's aspiration for justice, of his past and current
attempts to find standards of guidance for the administration of justice
in an increasingly complex and crowded world. Many of our familiar
conceptions of justice are tested, and rejected as furnishing any singly
acceptable criteria. The majority will is hard to ascertain and productive of error. Justice as defined in the ancient word is entitled to
respect, but often confronts us with an orthodoxy outworn, while
divine law presents its own peculiar problems of discernment. Justice
as that which brings happiness to the greatest number is of small aid
in the generality of cases, where the problem is not to decide which of
several benefits people ought to want, but to allocate between rival
aspirants the very thing they do want. Natural law with its claimed
universality of application, unchanging and everlasting, has its own
difficulties of definition but, as the author notes has had something of
a revival in our times. In fact, he performs the rather improbable feat
of lining up Blackstone the religionist and Holmes the skeptic under
the aegis of the law of nature. This is possible, of course, only by the
most expanded definition of the doctrine.
In summary, the author concludes that governing indeed represents
a series of choices, and that all men are not governed alike. In this
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exercise of discriminatory choice we are able to perceive something
of the nature of Justice. But as to what justice is, we are forced to
join with Plato in his ancient confession of failure: "for I know not
what Justice is." However, the business of governing goes on, as it
must if we are to survive, and the choices made will be found to rest
upon application of multiple criteria, a blend of motives, and a mixture
of political theory.
It seems to me that the difficulties which beset the reviewer of a
book are often in inverse ratio to the size of the book, itself. Particularly, where the book is concerned with a theme which has confounded
thoughtful men of all the Ages. Professor Sutherland does not appear
in the least hampered by the page limitation of The Law and One Man
Among Many. From the outset, he manages the impression that he has
something important to say, and proceeds to say it with a refreshing
display of modesty and sincerity. With so much in the book to appreciate and applaud, it is difficult to come to grips with evaluation of its
central theme, and the extent to which the author has accomplished
what he set out to do. It is obviously unfair to criticize a writer because he wrotethe book he did, in place of one he did not. But at least
a partial objection along these lines seems valid. After its impressive
statement of position, and brilliant exposition of man's unswerving
attempts to find standards which will parallel his aspirations for justice, the conclusions finally drawn are indeed anti-climactic. Perhaps
it is just a case of the author's having raised our hopes too high, but
it comes as neither news nor comfort that "we know not what Justice
is," and that the choices which affect man's freedom always rest upon
multiple criteria, each having some value, and a blend of motives, and
a mixture of political theory.
Some readers may be less troubled by the relative inconclusiveness
of the author's summation, than by certain of his primary assumptions
upon which the entire structure depends. His definition of freedom as
the mathematical sum of all the multiple helps and hindrances supplied or imposed by man's natural, private, and civic surroundings
seems to be no more than a restatement of pluralism, broadened perhaps to include environmental "sovereignties," along with those of
private or occupational groups in the modern community, intermediate
between the individual and the state. The validity or invalidity of the
doctrine of pluralism is unaffected by its being recast into the form of
an algebraic equation. A more pertinent objection to the definition of
freedom herein is that it contemplates freedom as a goal, rather than
a method. As a method, freedom may be related to the value of human
life in much the same sense that the army is related to national security, or commerce to wealth, or due process to the decided case. When
viewed as a datum which may be extracted by simple arithmetic, free-
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dom loses its deeper meaning and is effectively split off from its functioil.
Professor Sutherland also defines "individualism" as a belief in the
desirability of a man's being left to do as he pleases, so long as he does
not too shockingly interfere with somebody else's doing the same.
This definition he ties in with the stated assumption that the most
desirable objective of society to achieve is the greatest possible average
of individual freedom for the members of that society. It is not clear,
nor perhaps important to this discussion, whether these are statements
of preferred position, or whether the author is merely reading the
minutes of the last meeting and noting current acceptance of these
points of view.
The troubling effect of these definitions is not limited to such obvious unanswered questions, as what do you mean by "as he pleases"?
Is the action or inaction thus enabled that which does please him, or
that which he believes pleasing, or will it be limited to that which
would and should please him, if he were reasonably average in his
desires and capacity for appreciation? The difficulty runs deeper. If
taken at face value, this elevation of the individual conscience to the
role of court of last resort (limited only by the competition of the
conscience or desire mechanism of other men or groups) sounds like a
jurisprudential accommodation worked out between Austin and
Thoreau. it must be conceded that modern man is the inheritor of an
orthodoxy which consists in holding that the universe only exists and
is governed for the sake of mankind, or, as it is sometimes more palatably put, for the spirit of man. But from this persuasion, it would
seem a fateful, though beguiling, step to cast man in a new juristic
image: a man without moral commitment to others, or to life; to each,
himself.
Summing up: a tremendously provocative book which merits careful reading by all those who claim an interest in the law.
IXENMTH B. HUGHPS*
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL. By Edward Ross Aranow

and Herbert A. Einhorn. New York: Columbia University Press,
1957. Pp. xxiii, 577. $15.00
Anyone engaged in or contemplating participation in a proxy contest should have this volume under his arm, not on his desk. It is
a practical handbook describing the step by step battle of a contest
for corporate control. It is documented by illustrations from well
known proxy contests of recent years and a full citation of authori-

ties.
*Professor of Law, B3oston UniVetsity.

